just world beliefs, religiosity and stuff

For what it is worth here are some notes on an article I must have reviewed for one of my classes.

Aronson, Elliot. 1997. “Back to the Future: Retrospective Review of Leon Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance”. American Journal of Psychology 110, 1: 127-137.
Aronson proposes a revision to strengthen the theory of cognitive dissonance; he argues that dissonance is most clear when the inconsistency is between a cognition about the self and behaviour in violation of this cognition (131). Thus the individual’s “self-concept” is crucial to what is found to be inconsistent.
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In a nutshell …

Abstract

Within the literature on just world beliefs there is a recurring argument that religiosity is positively related to just world beliefs. This thesis, along with other studies, indicates otherwise. Measures of religiosity and general religious beliefs were not substantively related to the belief in a just world in two surveys of university undergraduates.

Unsatisfactory accounts of the relationship between religiosity and just world beliefs obscure some previously unexamined assumptions about this relationship. This thesis has examined the assumption that the Christian religion promotes the belief in a just world,
revealing that religious beliefs about suffering challenge the belief in the justness of the world. Highly religious Christians indicated negligible support for the belief that people who are suffering are being punished by God. The dominant explanations for human suffering were that suffering is a result of the fallen state of humankind and the consequence of the actions of sinful people. Religious beliefs about suffering were argued, and found in some instances, to be important in determining the nature of the relationship between religiosity and just world beliefs.

The research presented here provides a more accurate description of the nature of the relationship between the belief in a just universe and the belief in a just world. There has been a tendency to overstate the case for a positive relationship between just world beliefs and religiosity, based on the explanation that religious people believe in ultimate justice. The thesis found that just world beliefs and just universe beliefs are distinct and possibly independent beliefs. Believing that the universe is just is not likely to be highly related to the belief in justice on earth. In contrast to just world beliefs, religiosity was found to be strongly related to the belief in the justness of the universe.

Here are the references used in my thesis. This normally comes last of course, but there are some good finds here for anyone interested in Just World Beliefs and how it relates to Religion.

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In 2000 I completed a Masters Thesis entitled, Blaming the Sinner or the Sin? Just World Beliefs, Religiosity, and Explanations for Suffering. I am going to present this in portions in the Thesis category, not necessarily in order (in fact definitely not in order).

If you are interested in contacting me about the research please leave a comment - all comments are moderated and won’t show up automatically.

Originally written for a Political Science Course on New Zealand Foreign Policy in 1997. This is the first part of several that constitute a paper on East Timor and New Zealand Foreign Policy. The Works Cited of course normally come at the end of the paper - but I thought that might be the most useful part initially to post. Click the category linked to above to see other parts of the paper (when they are published).
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Originally written for a Psychology Research Methods Course in 1997.

introduction

The usual convention in starting an evaluation of method is to define the terms, however, this is a major problem we face in examining exploratory factor analysis, for our view of the “ontological status of theoretical entities” (Maxwell, 1962) governs how we define factors and ascribes the legitimate use to which we can put exploratory factor analysis. Royce provides a summary of some of the positions taken on factors:

Factors have been defined as dimensions, determinants, functional unities, parameters, and taxonomic categories. In terms of their theoretical significance they have been referred to as convenient classificatory conceptualizations …, as real … , and as artifactors (1963: 522).

To understand these differences in definition we need to explore the realist-instrumentalist debate. After examining this debate and a third associated position, the assumptions and problems associated with exploratory factor analysis will be discussed. An attempt will be made to integrate the usual perspective of exploratory factor analysis as involving inductive inference and Haig’s (1996) assertion that is involves abductive inference. Concluding we will see that: “it [exploratory factor analysis] allows for a number of relatively unexplored domains to be investigated so that they might form data bases out of which highly specific hypotheses may be generated” (Gorsuch, 1988: 235). Before this we have to make certain distinctions.

Factor analysis developed as an exploratory method. Spearman, the originator, developed it for this purpose (Kline, 1994: 7) Not until the 1970’s did it develop as a confirmatory method (Kline, 1994: 10). The distinction can be made between exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis.In the case of exploratory factor analysis “the researcher would not venture any forecasts on the nature and structure of factors of factors that will be extracted from his matrix. The latter [confirmatory factor analysis] obtains when he sets forth an explicit hypotheses on such nature and structure, and treats factor analysis as a test that will either confirm or disconfirm his expectations” (Marradi, 1981: 26-27). The key distinction is whether hypotheses are stated prior to the method being employed (Gorsuch, 1988: 235).

A distinction must be made between common factor analysis and principle component factor analysis. Principle component analysis is one attempt to overcome factor indeterminacy, a problem associated with common factor analysis. Factor indeterminacy will be discussed later in this paper. For the purposes of this discussion only exploratory common factor analysis will be considered when we speak of exploratory factor analysis.
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Originally written for a Psychology Research Methods Course in 1997.

Introduction

Quasi-experimentation is a method developing out of the realities of investigating cause in the social world. Underlying the procedures of quasi-experimentation are certain assumptions regarding the reality and knowledge of causation. I will argue that quasi-experimentation is not only a method for investigating cause in the complex social world, but it also reflects that social world. Firstly, exploring causality in the social world is complicated and difficult, so certain assumptions and practices are undertaken, some of which are problematic. Secondly, the experimenter is both product of and participant in this social world. Thirdly, both the practice of method and interpretation of results is undertaken in the context of a community of study and a wider social system. The usefulness of quasi-experimentation as a method is ultimately dependent on the individual’s judgement and the critique of the community of study.

I will discuss how the social world has created the need for quasi-experimentation. The role of individual and group in the concept and process of plausibility will be outlined. The concept of validity, and internal validity in particular, will be examined. Quasi-experimentation’s basis on falsification and manipulabilty will be explained and critiqued. Alternative methods for exploring causation in the field will be briefly discussed before finally inspecting quasi-experimentation as a critical method.

Cook and Campbell, the major authority on quasi-experimental method, define quasi-experiments as “experiments that have treatments, outcome measures, and experimental units, but do not use random assignment to create the comparisons from which treatment-caused change is inferred” (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 6). Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Cook and Campbell (1979) set out to establish the “threats to validity”, where validity is “the best available approximation to the truth … of propositions” in conducting research without randomisation (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 37). The main focus of these works were to identify possible threats and identify designs that eliminate particular threats. Cook and Campbell divide validity into four categories. Firstly internal validity, which is concerned with establishing causality at the level of sample and setting (Cook, 1991: 128). Statistical conclusion validity is concerned with the correct conclusion regarding the source of covariation (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 37). A third categorisation was external validity, that is the validity of generalisations “to and across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different types of persons, settings and times” (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 37). Fourthly, the concern of construct validity is with generalising across and to constructs of both cause and effect (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 38).
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